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A basic principle of economics is that people always prefer a larger set of opportunities. Money 
illusion can be considered as the phenomenon when people may not correctly perceive their budget 
constraints, and may act in ways that run counter to this preference. In this interpretation, money 
illusion is a cognitive bias, worthwhile to overcome. Herein I argue that taking a view of human 
decision-making based on certain strands of cognitive psychology, one can reinterpret the evidence 
for money illusion in two ways. First, I claim that money illusion is inescapable to some extent, and 
saying that we suffer from it is similar to alleging that we experience optical illusions, only because 
we are unable to see, say, individual atoms. Second, taking a view on “preferences” different from 
the traditional one, I contend that it may bring little benefi t to get rid of money illusion even in the 
cases where it is possible to do so. To follow up the visual analogy, even if we can improve our eye-
sight it is not obviously desirable. These arguments seem to lead to a Candidean disposition: there 
is no possible improvement on the state of affairs as far as “money illusion” is concerned. Nonethe-
less, I will make some positive proposals concerning economic policy and economics research. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. The money illusion problem
Economic textbooks assert that money is, first of all, a means of exchange (see, for 
instance Mankiw 2009, Ch. 21). Clower (1967) defined it more formally: money 
is a commodity that is exchangeable for (almost) any other commodities. Then the 
textbooks proceed by telling us that money has other functions, such as store of 
value and unit of account. General exchangeability is the distinguishing property 
of money since many other (durable) goods serve as store of value, and the unit of 
account function is shared with non-moneys and “non-commodities”, as “pure” 
units of account have always existed (Weber 1996)). Most economic models make 
the additional assumption that money is a good that does not enter directly into the 
utility functions of agents, or, in other words, it has only indirect utility. 
In most expositions the unit of account function is played down, it is men-
tioned only for the sake of curiosity, and then gets hardly any attention. On the 
one hand, in standard microeconomics it is emphasized that, in principle, any 
good can serve as the unit of account. On the other hand, modern Neoclassical 
“New-Keynesian” theories attribute a special role to money prices, by pointing 
out that instantaneous market clearing is not attained because of the rigidity of 
prices set in nominal (i.e. money) terms. But the reason why prices are set in 
nominal terms is not derived from first principles, it is usually accepted as an em-
pirical fact. In fact, money as a unit of account involves in it a deeply disturbing 
problem: that of money illusion. 
A long tradition in economics can be epitomized by the sentence: “Money 
is a veil” (Pigou 1949). Money illusion can be formulated as the phenomenon 
that some people sometimes behave in ways as if they did not realize that it is 
true. While economic information is presented to us in monetary terms (money 
prices, money income and wealth in monetary units), some of us cannot see 
through the veil, and consequently, they make decisions against their own best 
interests: they disregard the changes in the price level, thus they confuse nomi-
nal and real prices.
Economists are proud of being able to reach out beyond appearances, and this 
short phrase is probably one of the main triumphs of economics. I think very few 
uninitiated persons understand its deep meaning, though experience shows that it 
can be taught, and those who apprehend it, might acquire a sense of its veracity 
as something inevitable. A few semesters in micro- and macroeconomics would 
probably be enough to make a second nature of the idea that money has only “in-
direct” utility, i.e. people acquire money in order to spend it on real things (goods 
or services). In other words, what really matters for them is the purchasing power 
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of money (the quantity of goods and services one can buy for a certain amount of 
it), and not its mere nominal value. 
Please notice that I’m not sarcastic: despite the fact that I’m going to offer a 
view that is different from this, I must acknowledge that the traditional concep-
tual framework of economics with preferences or utilities defined on the states 
of nature is a great intellectual achievement, certainly superior to naïve or folk 
economic ideas that have no notions of real money, price-indices, direct and in-
direct utilities and so on. Even the assumption of monotonic preferences (“more 
is always better”), admittedly an auxiliary assumption, can be accepted as a very 
good first approximation to explaining economic behaviour in many contexts. 
But admitting the usefulness of the traditional framework does not mean that 
we should not recognize its limits, and whenever these limits are reached, one 
needs to seek new avenues. When modern economics was born, the contempo-
rary psychology could not give much ammunition to a clear and analytical ap-
proach to economic decisions. In the last decades, however, cognitive psychol-
ogy has progressed even in ways of formal modelling, giving us hopes that its 
otherwise well-known achievements can be readily adopted by economists who 
have developed a predilection for mathematical models as a necessary precondi-
tion for a theory. 
1.2. Money illusion in the economic literature
It is believed that Irving Fisher was the first who coined the term “money illu-
sion” (Fisher 1928). Later on, money illusion came to be strongly associated 
with Keynes’s General Theory. He used it as a temporary assumption to explain 
unemployment through the hypothesis of downward wage rigidity. However, the 
intellectual trends of the mid-20th century favoured the idea that the rest of the 
humankind is not fundamentally different from the economists, and the fortune of 
money illusion was, as it were, reversed: money is a veil, and money illusion is, at 
worst, temporary and negligible. Probably it is telling what James Tobin (a Nobel-
 prize winner generally regarded as a Keynesian) wrote in his 1972 address to the 
American Economic Association: “an economic theorist can of course commit no 
greater crime than to assume money illusion” (Tobin 1972).
However, dissident voices always existed (e.g. Modigliani – Cohn 1979; 
Akerlof et al. 1996; Shiller 1997; Bewley 1998), and as psychology and econom-
ics joined forces a slow but significant change in the attitude towards money illu-
sion emerged among economists. By now even experimental and neuroscientific 
evidences have been marshalled to make the idea of money illusion acceptable , 
194 János VINCZE
Acta Oeconomica 69 (2019)
and it has become a building block of the psychological reinterpretation of macro-
 economics in Akerlof – Shiller (2009, Chapter 4).
Behavioural economics is widely identified as an application of modern psy-
chology in economics, where psychological discoveries find their way into math-
ematical models comparable to those that had been used in economics for at least 
a hundred years (Camerer – Lowenstein 2004). However, I share the opinion of 
those who believe that economists have abducted psychology in this marriage, 
and shaped it according to their own tastes (Berg – Gigerenzer 2010). While ad-
mitting that behavioural economics is a great improvement on traditional econom-
ics, I also believe that it has, in some ways, warped it, and is impeding progress 
eventually. Instead of generalizing the traditional conceptual framework, more 
fundamental changes, i.e. a radically new framework, would have been needed.1 
This new framework (as a set of ideas) is available in the form of existing cogni-
tive architectures, a subfield of computational psychology. In this paper, I make 
use of the notions incorporated in this field, and derive their implications for the 
treatment of the money illusion problem. The key concepts turn out to be explicit 
and implicit knowledge representation, and my principal claim is that an “illu-
sion-free” explicit representation of value is infeasible, therefore we are bound to 
suffer from money illusion, though are not helpless about it.
* * *
Section 2 describes the cognitive framework in which I analyse money illusion. 
Section 3 presents the basic money illusion evidence, and its reinterpretation. Sec-
tion 4 enlists our ways of handling money illusion, and Section 5 takes hints about 
the psychological origins of money illusion. Finally, in Section 6, after summaris-
ing the argument, it is shown that positive conclusions can be obtained, too.
2. A COGNITIVE APPROACH TO ECONOMIC DECISIONS
One of the most widely accepted tenets of cognitive psychology is that the mind 
builds and acts on internal representations of the outside world, and we have at 
our disposal several representations for the same problem. Shafir et al. (1997) 
suggested that money illusion is a case of improperly using a certain kind of 
representation (a “nominal” one), whereas the correct thing would be to apply 
1  Concerning the relationship between psychology and economics, the general argument in this 
article follows that in Gigerenzer et al. (2008) and Berg – Gigerenzer (2010). My contribution 
is the emphasis on the role of knowledge representation, and the distinctions between different 
kinds of knowledge representations.     
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a “real” representation. The authors assert that this is the salience and ease of 
nominal representations that make them alluring for us. This explanation leaves a 
number of questions unanswered. For instance, what do salience and ease mean 
in this context? How are the representations created, and what is their role in the 
decision process? How can we devise “real” as opposed to “nominal” represen-
tations? Why can it be that people act upon representations which lead them to 
decisions that seem to be at variance with their best interests?
Knowledge representation is missing from the economics literature, therefore 
I had to turn to psychology to look for theoretical frameworks that can accom-
modate the idea of a choice between representations, where “choice” may not 
entail consciousness. Cognitive architectures are computerized expressions of 
theoretical models of behaviour where knowledge representations play funda-
mental roles in the simulated activity of the mind (Anderson 2007). They are es-
sentially computational theories of cognition, and have been used extensively by 
psychologists, neuroscientists and artificial intelligence (AI) researchers. Build-
ing cognitive architectures is a research programme that has its origins in the 
work of Herbert Simon (incidentally a Nobel-prize winner in economics), and 
Alan Newell. My discussion below draws on two sources: the Adaptive Con-
trol of Thought-Rational (ACT-R) cognitive architecture (Anderson 2007) and 
the Connectionist Learning with Adaptive Rule Induction On-line (CLARION) 
project (Sun 2003). 
2.1. Production rules and representation in the ACT-R cognitive architecture
The ACT-R cognitive architecture has three important features: the distinction 
between declarative and procedural memory, a modular structure wherein differ-
ent modules communicate with each other, and it implements rational analysis, a 
type of reinforcement learning.
Problem solving starts with an initial representation of the problem which de-
pends ineluctably on the perceptual input. Then the program carries out informa-
tion processing via the activity of the procedural module that may re-represent 
the problem and/or the goals. The procedural module works through produc-
tion rules (i.e. “if ... then ...” structures). It looks for information in declarative 
memory where “factual” knowledge (propositions about the world) is stored. If a 
production rule’s “if” part has a pattern that matches either a problem, or a goal 
or a fact, then it has the potential to “fire”, that is, to carry out some computation 
defined by the “then” part of the rule. This computation can result either in the 
derivation of new facts, or in calling new procedures to work, or in giving a mes-
sage to an output interface.
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There may exist cases where there are several matches, so there is a need for 
a mechanism that resolves possible conflicts. In ACT-R this is done by selecting 
one of the matched procedures by a probabilistic rule that takes into account their 
“utilities” (rational analysis). The “utility” of each procedure is updated at any 
time the simulated brain perceives a “reward”. Mathematical formulas (based on 
the accepted theories in psychology) determine how rewards are converted into 
changes in the utility scores of procedures. Non-use is penalized, thus a procedure 
rarely employed has less and less chance to be applied, except if other competing 
procedures score even worse.2 
2.2. Explicit and implicit representation in CLARION 
CLARION features a dual knowledge representation approach: it distinguishes 
between explicit and implicit knowledge (or top and bottom level knowledge, re-
spectively) (Sun 2003). Compared to ACT-R the novelty is the bottom (implicit) 
level. In this approach knowledge is not represented symbolically, like individu-
ally distinct concepts, sentences or rules, but in a distributed manner (sometimes 
referred to as a sub-symbolic representation). The representation of implicit 
knowledge is through neural networks, and learning in the bottom level takes 
the form of training of these networks. The declarative memory (called the “non-
action centred subsystem”) at the bottom level consists of associative memory 
networks. Whereas at the top level knowledge can be likened to clear definitions 
and/or statements (similar to the declarative module in ACT-R), at the bottom-
level it is like “vague” associations between properties, interpreted as “intuitive”, 
or non-conscious. The two subsystems are interrelated, and are combined when 
making decisions. There are possibilities to transport knowledge acquired on the 
“intuitive” level to the conscious (explicit) system, and vice versa.
CLARION also contains subsystems that control the whole cognitive process, 
called meta-cognitive and motivational subsystems. The idea is that we have pri-
mary drives (for instance “get food!”) that control our behaviour through creating 
secondary drives (for instance, “get chocolate!”). Whereas primary drives are 
hard wired, secondary drives and goals are learnt and also possess explicit and 
implicit representations.   
2  The concept of rationality in ACT-R seems to me very similar to the notion of ecological 
rationality (see among others Goldstein – Gigerenzer 2002; Berg – Gigerenzer 2010). In-
deed, ACT-R appears as a computational version of the adaptive toolbox theory (Gigerenzer 
– Selten 2001; Gigerenzer – Gaissmaier 2011), which is also based on ecological rationality.  
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For my purposes the dual nature of representations is a crucial addition made 
by this framework. According to this theory the decision-making process can be 
carried out on both the explicit and the implicit levels, and the two levels can 
interact in complex ways.3 
Notice that in the case of the simple decision problem analysed above, there 
does not seem to be a need to use implicit knowledge. In this case, and in similar 
artificial (experimental) situations, the task is formulated in terms of, presumably, 
clear concepts, and it is not obvious how the “intuitive” subsystem can interfere 
in the decision. Still, the outcome of this experiment and that of similar experi-
ments may be interpreted by invoking the non-conscious. 
2.3. Feasible representations of wealth (income)
Money illusion is a problem with having and using representations of wealth.4 
Let us look at an economic decision problem that most of us have met some time 
during our life. Suppose I receive an offer from a bank to place at least 1000 euros 
in a special deposit for one year with a promise to get it back augmented with a 
5% rate of interest. To accept or refuse such an offer requires very complex rea-
soning. I give here only a few of the salient considerations that can cross one’s 
mind. 
•  First, I have to look for alternatives. If I accept the offer, would I change my 
portfolio (the mixture of my assets), or shall I plan to change my spending 
strategy for the future? 
•  Second, what is the “value” of 1050 euros tomorrow (capital plus interest) 
compared to the “value” of the 1000 euros today?   
•  Third, I had a similar offer 3 years ago, which I accepted, was I satisfied with 
that decision, and if not, why? 
3  The dual systems’ view appears under different names in the psychology literature (Sun 2015). 
Compared to the alternatives, the theory incorporated in CLARION has a very important 
feature: the distinction is based on representations (symbolic or distributed). When we talk 
or write we use a symbolic, explicit representation, and therefore, it is not easy to describe 
sub-symbolic (distributed) representations in natural language. Perhaps the most we can say of 
them is that this type of knowledge cannot be told in so many words.  A comparison between 
a least squares regression model and an artificial neural network may help to understand the 
distinction. Individual parameters are easy to interpret in the regression model, whereas indi-
vidual nodes have no distinct meaning in the network.
4  Conceptually, income is the change in wealth per period of time. Therefore, I will refer to the 
representation of income and wealth interchangeably.  
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To answer these questions I must have representations of the offer in mind. 
There exists obviously a nominal representation. 
Explicit nominal representations 
“I give now 1000 euros and get back 1050 euros in a year time.” This representa-
tion is defined in terms of a monetary unit which is used as a means of exchange. 
It is clear that nominal representations are not unique, as a conversion of euros to 
dollars or to other currencies is always feasible. The point is that these things are 
not what we are supposed to consume.  
Explicit real representation 
“I give now 1000 2017-euros, and will get back 1040 2017-euros based on the 
Eurozone’s expected consumer price index (CPI).” There is no unique way to rep-
resent the offer explicitly in real terms. One can change the base year (2017), the 
CPI, or the method of calculating expected inflation (not even specified above). 
The essential point is to define purchasing power as equivalent to a certain amount 
of nominal money in terms of some real measurement unit. However, this repre-
sentation involves several options, in fact more than a nominal representation.  
Implicit real representation 
In this case one cannot describe the representation succinctly. This is a major 
trouble with sub-symbolic representations: they defy symbolic representations. 
The offer of 1050 euros tomorrow for 1000 euros today becomes an input signal 
to a neural network together with other signals that may contain price informa-
tion of many goods, and/or the CPI read in the newspaper. The network associates 
these signals with outputs, whose values can be implicitly interpreted as “the real 
value of euro”, but it cannot be expressed in so many words. This output signal is 
not immediately and automatically accessible at the top level, but by the explicit 
knowledge subsystem, only in the context of some task, it is activated. For in-
stance, if someone asks the explicit question: “can I buy for 1050 euros tomorrow 
the same amount of goods as for 1000 euros today?”, the implicit knowledge base 
can be queried to give an (intuitive) answer of “yes” or “no”. And, the implicit 
real representation needs not be unique either. Different experiences can shape 
our intuitive knowledge base through our lifetime, though it may be conjectured 
that similar people would have functionally similar representations.    
In the next section, I discuss the money illusion evidence in terms of these 
three representations.  
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3. THE MONEY ILLUSION EVIDENCE AND ITS REINTERPRETATION
3.1. The empirical evidence
The lady with 50 000 dollars
A lady inherited 50 000 dollars in 1892, and this sum was given to a trustee who 
invested it in bonds. Irving Fisher (1927) accompanied her to the trustee in 1920, 
and listened to his boasting of keeping her wealth intact, as she still owned almost 
50 000 dollars in bonds. Fisher was quick to point out that this sum was worth 
much less than in 1892, and that the annual 2500 – 3000 dollars that the lady had 
received as income was simply eating up the principal. Fisher did not question the 
good faith of the trustee, and interpreted his failure to preserve the lady’s fortune 
as an example of money illusion. Neither the lady nor the trustee had considered 
the “real” value of dollars, and thus, were satisfied with the outcome. Fisher ex-
plained him that during those 28 years of falling dollar the creditors-bondholders 
lost, whereas the debtors-stockholders won. According to Fisher, the trustee could 
eventually understand his reasoning, claiming only that it was not his fault.
How can we characterise her behaviour on the basis of the decision-theory 
outlined in the previous Section? 
The widow’s problem as seen by the lady
Problem Shall I keep the trustee?
Goal Determine whether he is a person who could preserve my wealth!
Declarative fact  Wealth is measured in dollars. 
Heuristic 2 If an advisor preserves the value of my wealth, then he must be kept.
As the dollar value of her portfolio did not decrease the lady kept the trustee 
for 28 years. Fisher thought that it was a big mistake, since just preserving the 
dollar value of the portfolio was not enough to preserve its real value (measured 
in purchasing power equivalent), and the trustee must have been fired. Fisher’s 
solution can be characterised with the retrieval of an additional fact from declara-
tive memory: The value of the portfolio must be measured in constant purchasing 
power dollars. 
The widow’s problem as seen by Fisher
Problem Shall I keep the trustee?
Goal Determine whether he is a person who could preserve my wealth!
Declarative fact  The value of the portfolio must be measured in constant purchasing power 
dollars.  
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The widow’s problem as seen by Fisher
Heuristic 1   If my portfolio’s value in constant dollars decreased, then the advisor did 
not preserve my wealth.
Heuristic 2 If an advisor did not preserve wealth, then he must be fired.
Thus the new representation would lead to a different decision. At some point 
between 1892 and 1920 the lady would have realised that her portfolio lost part 
of its purchasing power, and she would have fired the trustee. The difference in 
behaviour would have been due to the re-representation of the goal in real terms. 
However, one can ask whether the average man could master the concept of con-
stant purchasing power dollars. This tale and several other stories of Fisher seem 
to indicate that even professionals (businessmen, financial advisors) do not use 
explicit real representations. Having an explicit real representation has some pre-
requisites: 1. To know and understand the usefulness of the concept of deflating 
by a price index; and 2. Being aware of and repeatedly retrieving the numerical 
value of the index. Today a large number of people acquire a basic knowledge of 
economics, and thereby, of price indices and inflation adjustment. Nevertheless, 
as the analysis of the other examples will show, explicit real representations are 
rare, and even then, “fleeting”. 
What about an implicit real representation? It is perhaps more surprising that 
the story indicates that not even implicit knowledge of the change in the real 
value of the dollar was present in the minds of the protagonists. 
As the cognitive model described above suggests heuristics and (involved) 
representations must be learned, and are in competition with each other. Then, 
one must ask what advantages the lady would have had by owning either an ex-
plicit or an implicit real representation of value. For the time being let us take it 
for granted that getting rid of the underperforming trustee is a “good” decision. 
Can we formulate another behaviour resulting in exactly the same outcome?
The widow’s problem from a different perspective
Problem Shall I keep the trustee?
Goal Determine whether the trustee is a person who preserves my wealth better 
than other trustees preserve the wealth of their clients. 
Declarative fact  Value is measured in dollars. 
Heuristic     If the goal is to “Determine whether the trustee is a person who preserves 
my wealth better than other trustees preserve the wealth of their clients”, 
then ask your friends about the change in values of their portfolios, then 
compare their returns with your own return, and, if it is not lower, retain, 
but if it is lower, fire the trustee. 
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The heuristic here looks like a complex one, but, in fact, it is an instantiation of 
a general social heuristic which suggests that you should seek advice from your 
social circle (Pachur et al. 2004), and the principle that abilities must be judged 
by relative performance. It is likely that this latter – more complicated – behav-
iour must have resulted in the firing of the trustee at some time. Let us compare 
the two “successful” procedures!
The relative performance procedure has certain advantages over the procedure 
based on real representations. First, real representations (either explicit or implic-
it) can be easily “forgotten” if they are not used frequently, whereas the second 
procedure is built on the instantiation of a general purpose heuristics. Second, it 
is based, in general, on a better measure of advisory performance, since it may 
occur that investment outcomes are so poor that even the best advice is not suf-
ficient to get positive “real” returns.  
Apparently the lady was not dissatisfied with the performance of her portfolio. 
There is no need to judge her behaviour as rational or irrational. The only point 
I would like to stress here is that if her behaviour had required correction, there 
would have occurred an easier way to rectify it, than to learn how to represent 
real value. 
A German shopkeeper during hyperinflation
The scene is the outskirts of Berlin, the date is 1922. Fisher is buying a shirt and 
is talking to the shopkeeper, whom he finds very intelligent. Fisher thinks that the 
price is extremely low, and is surprised by the unwarranted generosity, but the 
woman answers that she is gaining a small profit because she has paid less for the 
shirt in the first place. 
Fisher and Thaler (1997) comments on this story in an article where he gives 
the honorific title of “behavioural economist” to Fisher – finds here again an 
example of money illusion. The woman does not understand that she is making 
a loss rather than a profit in real terms, because she does not understand that the 
purchasing power of the Mark has significantly dropped, due to the 50% general 
price increase between buying and selling the shirt. 
The shopkeeper’s problem was “how to price the shirt?”, and she apparently 
used the heuristic of pricing in terms of acquisition cost, measured in money. 
Judging by her comment on profitability, the shopkeeper did not use a real rep-
resentation (either explicit or implicit). But what would she have gained with the 
access to a real representation? It would have meant that she would have priced 
the shirt Fisher bought in constant-Mark terms (the case of an explicit real rep-
resentation) or, at least, would have made some upward “inflation” adjustment 
(a likely consequence of an implicit real representation). She may have made a 
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business mistake when she calculated profits in money terms, but the mistake 
may have been there if she had made the calculation in “real” terms. To wit: from 
a “rational” profit-maximizing point of view shirts must be priced at current op-
portunity costs, and not at historical costs. Pricing based on historical real costs 
might make things worse in certain circumstances, though may be an advantage 
if the replacement price of shirts moved roughly together with general inflation. 
(Judging by the Chart on Fisher (1927: 9) he made this latter assumption tacitly.) 
Then pricing in “real” terms may be an improvement, with which one could re-
place the burden of monitoring competitors’ and suppliers’ prices, but it is not the 
first best solution. 
Representations may have an effect on the evaluation of the situation. Think-
ing that she has made a profit might have given her a positive reinforcement, 
otherwise she would have felt frustrated because of losing money. Whether this 
“mistake” in experiencing utility is a mistake at all is a deep question that I could 
not consider here. I just want to notice that as long as she behaved irrationally it 
was not an immediate consequence of money illusion, but rather of the bounded 
rational habit of acquisition costs based pricing. The fact that the woman must 
have grown up in an environment where prices were stable might have contrib-
uted to this error, as acquisition and opportunity costs usually do not differ much 
if the general price level is stable, and, in such circumstances, acquisition costs 
based pricing could not be detected as mistaken.   
The mistake is caused by the interplay of the nominal representation and acqui-
sition cost based pricing. This duo works tolerably well under stable price levels. 
The switch to opportunity cost pricing is the first best solution, in principle, but it 
needs monitoring the opportunity costs, an activity which is not free. Having an 
explicit real representation of acquisition costs would have been an improvement, 
but not a perfect solution. Having an implicit real representation may have led to 
a search for an alternative procedure, perhaps to opportunity cost pricing. Thus, 
in this case again, real representations may have helped in bringing about the 
good solution, but it might have been obtained without them, just as well. 
Another element in this story is her insistence on being honest, and not a 
profiteer. It appears as a separate motive that might have had a role in her pric-
ing decision. Fisher relates other stories where this fairness motive shows up in 
strange and, apparently, self-destructive ways. Fisher (1927: 8) told an American 
woman’s case, who had to repay a loan in Germany after the Great War. She 
thought that she owed 7 000 US dollars, and was surprised when it turned out that 
she should pay only the equivalent of 250 dollars, due to the depreciation of the 
Mark. She even insisted on ethical grounds to pay 7 000. Thus, Fisher comment-
ed that if she had wanted to be fair in real terms, she must have offered 12 000 
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dollars, equivalent to “buying power” of 7 000 pre-war dollars. Unfortunately, he 
does not specify whether this buying power calculation refers to the Mark’s or the 
Dollar’s buying power. I guess this is the Mark’s, in which case one may ask why 
an American woman should be concerned with the Mark’s purchasing power. 
For her fairness was “defined” in terms of American dollars, and for the Berlin 
shopkeeper, in the previous example, in German marks. Incidentally, we can see 
a serious problem here with explicit representations of real value. The relevant 
price indices for making the deflation operation are “personal” rather than inter-
personal. It makes difficult to agree on what fairness means if the measures are 
not commensurable. Thus if we are concerned with fairness, nominal representa-
tions may dominate real representations.   
Long-term contracting in money terms
Shiller (1997) made the obvious observation that all over the world most pay-
ments are contracted in nominal terms, and indexation (by whatever price index) 
is extremely rare, except under conditions of high inflation. He points out that 
the price level, in the long run, is very unstable, and its forecast beyond a few 
years is highly imprecise, thus nominal contracting poses substantial risks both 
to creditors and debtors. Indexation must confer benefits for risk management 
reasons, and why the public resists it is a major puzzle for economic theory. With 
reference to history he could cite the prominent economists, even from the nine-
teenth century, who advocated indexation, as yet to not avail. We have here an 
issue which is indeed puzzling. Something that is mutually beneficial, is known 
to many people, and still, could not take root. Shiller conducted an in-depth em-
pirical investigation into the psychological-cognitive reasons why this is so. Us-
ing questionnaires in the US and Turkey, (where the puzzle was even more acute 
because of high and unstable inflation) he did not obtain a simple explanation, but 
uncovered a number of interesting facts. 
First, it was shown that many, though not all, people can understand the advan-
tages of indexation. Second, money illusion manifests itself very clearly when jus-
tifying nominal contracting, people say: “I want to know how much money I will 
be getting”. And these are often the same ones who have just correctly explained 
how indexation preserves real buying power (Shiller 1997). Third, the future un-
certainty of the price level is not appreciated in general. Fourth, many respondents 
believed that public price indices did not reflect their personal price indices. 
Shiller’s evidence exhibits that people acquire some concept of “real money”, 
but this concept is more implicit than explicit, largely qualitative, and depends 
on specific circumstances. The inconvenience of real representations is reflected 
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in the fact that those countries that have introduced indexation under very high 
inflation, drop it after inflation has abated. 
It is clear that indexation must be agreed on by the parties to a contract. In 
practice, it is necessary that many people be in agreement with it, as it is very 
unlikely that for the sake of a few of us banks will tailor their contracting terms. It 
seems that this agreement is widespread only at high levels of inflation, and even 
then indexation takes the form of variable interest rates rather than linking capital 
repayment and interests to some price index. Indexation, after all, affects the divi-
sion of some uncertain “pie” between creditors and borrowers, and we may guess 
that the nature of the value representation affects mutual understanding, on which 
bargaining must be based. If the price indices are individualized, “real” represen-
tations are incommensurable, and mutual understanding is jeopardized.
Nominal valuation formulas
In 1979, Modigliani – Cohn arrived at the striking conclusion that the market had 
been undervaluing equities for ten years due to money illusion. They identified 
two kinds of mispricing: 1. using nominal discount rates, and 2. neglecting the 
real revaluation gains on debt during times of unexpectedly high inflation. The 
latter is a recurring topic, as not recognizing revaluation of gains (or losses) was 
a leitmotif of Fisher’s analysis, too. But here the issue seems to be more serious 
and incredible. The authors confess that when the idea first occurred to them they 
swept it away as very unlikely. Is it believable that professionals producing these 
valuations are really unknowledgeable about inflation adjustment?
Besides providing indirect (statistical) evidence Modigliani and Cohn perused 
internal memoranda of large brokerage houses. They found direct evidence that 
valuation formulas indeed used nominal, rather than real, discount factors (though 
some adjustment for inflation existed), and largely ignored real revaluation. It 
seems then that money illusion (not adjusting adequately for price level changes) 
is not only a problem for the uneducated public.  
At first sight it is indeed hardly believable that finance professionals are una-
ware of the difference between real and nominal rates and the effect of inflation 
on real asset values. The most obvious explanation is that they do not have a 
common explicit real representation of value and would be loath to communicate 
something ambiguous to their investors. For instance, what is the deflator index 
for a dentist in Luxembourg, and that for a Japanese businessman? Long term 
real discount factors must be estimated, and probably no widely (globally) ac-
cepted method is available. The multiplicity of possible explicit real representa-
tions makes them unsuitable for communication to a wider public. 
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Downward nominal wage rigidity   
The infrequency of nominal wage cuts is normally regarded as evidence for mon-
ey illusion. Traditional reasoning tells us that firms and workers must care for 
the purchasing power of wages rather than their mere monetary value. A piece of 
strong evidence for nominal wage rigidity comes from studies showing that even 
in recessions money wages do not fall. See for instance Bewley (1998), where 
this is documented via questionnaires. This study indicates that money wage cuts 
are regarded as unfair and are feared to destroy morale within firms, with the at-
tendant negative consequences on productivity and future hiring. Alternatively, 
when inflation is positive workers frequently consent to unchanged nominal wag-
es. Interviewees reported that nominal, rather than real, wage cuts are considered 
unfair and incur retribution costs. Here one meets money illusion again; it seems 
decisions are conditioned on nominal wages, while presumably the true interests 
of workers and owners lie with “real” income. 
Other things being equal, a nominal wage reduction decreases instantaneously 
the wage-earner’s wealth (whichever representation he uses), while it also im-
plies some redistribution of wealth between him and his employer, thus raising a 
fairness concern. However, the very concept of redistribution presupposes com-
mensurability. Implicit real representations could not very well serve to compare 
the relative position of employees and employers. Then to have a common con-
cept of unfairness, at least, the representation of wealth must be common, and this 
can be achieved only by an explicit representation. The non-existence of common 
explicit real representations makes any individual real representation useless as 
far as bargaining through “fairness” is concerned. 
Should employers not be afraid of the retaliations in the form of lower produc-
tivity if only real, but not nominal, wages fall? If employees had only nominal 
representations of wealth, then they should not. However, if there are implicit real 
representations then the answer is “probably”. Then employees would feel sooner 
or later that both of their goals (having larger wealth and being treated fairly) 
are unfulfilled, and they would take action to remedy the situation. This might 
take a number of forms. There is a silent revenge (diminished morale, lower pro-
ductivity), or there are more vocal possibilities (asking for compensating rises, 
or switching to more formal automatic indexing). Indeed, employees must have 
some implicit real representations if indexation ever comes to their mind.  
Assessment of economic success 
The paper by Shafir et al. (1997) was an influential one on the road to the reha-
bilitation of money illusion. The authors reported a series of questionnaire evi-
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dence showing that respondents react in many cases exclusively to nominal rather 
than to real valuations. Unfortunately, several questions contained elements that 
mixed money illusion with other supposedly psychological factors (e.g. fairness 
and morale). The second problem in their article is perhaps the one where the 
money illusion issue appears in isolation. Respondents were asked to rank on the 
basis of how well three (fictitious) characters had done. Each one had inherited 
a house of the same dollar value, and then sold it after a year at different prices 
under different circumstances. Adam sold it after a year of 25% deflation at a 
price 23% lower than its initial value. Ben sold it in a zero-inflation environment 
at nominal and real loss of 1%. Carl sold it at 123% of its initial value, after a year 
of serious (25%) inflation. Thus the nominal gains were:
 Adam –23%      Ben –1%    Carl +23%
whereas the real gains (as all learned economists could calculate from the given 
inflation data):
 Adam +2%        Ben –1%     Carl –2%.
The replies were far from unequivocal. 48% of the respondents voted for Carl 
being the most successful, followed by Adam with 37%. Ben was listed as the 
worst-accomplishing person by 10% of the respondents.   
Shafir et al. (1997) hypothesised that our behaviour is conditioned on a mix-
ture of real and nominal representations of the decision problems. Also they sug-
gested that for many purposes there is no material difference in using either of 
the representations. For instance, in a static context the profit maximising choice 
is independent of the numeraire. The authors claim that nominal representations 
have the advantages of ease, salience and simplicity, and it is the reason why 
many of us apply them in preference to the “rational” real representation. 
In terms of the ACT-R theory, respondents represented wages nominally be-
cause people have “standing” nominal representations, and, in any case, the 
questions were formulated in nominal terms directly. So everyone in the experi-
ment must have had an initial nominal representation. Those who answered that 
they prefer larger nominal gains simply used a procedure, like “Higher value is 
preferable”; for them value was defined in dollars, and they simply ignored the 
inflation figures. This is the group exhibiting money illusion. Now the question 
is how we can reckon the behaviour of those whose answer was expressing pref-
erence for the wage that had the higher value after deflating by inflation. They 
must have developed a temporary (for the sake of the questionnaire) explicit 
real representation, based on the inflation figures provided by the interviewers. 
Probably not everybody has the analytical capabilities, the necessary knowledge 
or the incentives to accomplish this task. Simple logical operations may elude 
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us, and in this case it was indifferent whether one made mistakes or not. But, 
certainly many people acquire some training in economics where real represen-
tations are taught. 
Also, it is possible that other people have implicit real representations that are 
not quantitative. Though they may input figures like “prices increased by 2% 
since last year”, they may not transform this information into numeric values, 
rather only into a vague feeling that wages are worth not as much when inflation 
is higher. It is possible that the variability of responses is caused by the presence 
of this ambiguous group, who have an implicit real representation, but cannot 
deliver the fully rational quantitative analysis.  
3.2. The interpretation of money illusion experiments
Since the year 2000, several experiments were conducted to prove experimen-
tally the existence of money illusion. Though these experiments have uncovered 
some interesting psychological and neurological facts, they provide little new 
information on the money illusion problem, as they do not address the problem 
of whether or how we represent real value in practice.
Oligopoly experiments 
Fehr and Tyran (2001) conducted various experiments to show that money illusion 
matters in strategic situations. In all of these experiments agents played oligopoly 
pricing games. In some experiments payoffs were denominated (represented) in 
“points”, i.e. in artificial units. Participants knew how to convert points into Swiss 
francs, the currency in which they were paid. In other treatments payoffs were 
directly given in Swiss francs. In each experiments there were two stable equi-
libria: one of them is dominant in “nominal” (point) terms, while the other one 
is dominant in “real” (Swiss franc) terms. Fehr and Tyran’s main findings were 
the following: 1. In both treatments people reached eventually the equilibrium 
dominant in the “currency” in which the problem was formulated. 2. When hu-
man opponents were replaced by machines, whose behaviour was predetermined 
(effectively changing the task from strategic to merely optimising), participants 
converged on the decision optimal in Swiss franc (“real”) terms. 
They interpret this evidence as showing that the nominal illusion is an impor-
tant factor in strategic situations. They believe that people stick to the nominal 
representation because they are unsure whether their human opponents could 
switch to the real representation (strategic uncertainty). Note that in these experi-
ments Swiss francs were considered as “real”, whereas points as “nominal”. If 
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money illusion were some irrational attraction for “local money”, then the par-
ticipants should have preferred the real (Swiss franc) dominant equilibrium in 
any case.
The Fehr-Tyran experiments show that people are capable of building sev-
eral representations of the same problem. However, in their experiments repre-
sentations in points and in Swiss francs were the contenders, and not nominal 
and real representations. For me the experiments’ lessons include the following: 
1. Local moneys do not enjoy an undefeatable advantage as representatives of 
value. 2. The initial representation is preferred if coordination is an issue, and 
people want to make sure that others think like themselves. It is a framing effect, 
because the initial representation reflects framing, in this case controlled by the 
experimenter. People apparently do not trust others to carry out the cognitive feat 
of moving from the initial nominal (“point”) representation to the Swiss franc 
representation. 3. The experiments do not tell anything about real representations. 
Thus, on the whole the experiments provide valuable information on cognitive 
mechanisms, but they bear on the money illusion problem only indirectly. 
What does the fMRI signal?
Weber et al. (2009) looked for signs of money illusion in the activity of the brain. 
The medial prefrontal cortex is an area that has been shown to exhibit increased 
activities in response to “rewards”. In the experiments participants accomplished 
some task, and were rewarded with a certain prize denominated in dollars and 
with the possibility to buy items from a catalogue. In other words, the money 
prize was “earmarked” that could be used only for some definite purpose. In one 
condition both prizes and prices were 50% higher than in the other. As there were 
no other differences in “real” terms the experiments were identical. The func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) measurement of the blood oxygen 
level dependent (BOLD) activity showed higher responses at the time rewards 
were assigned in the “inflationary” (higher nominal income and higher prices) 
condition. The authors interpret this as supporting evidence to Shafir et al. (1997) 
that our brain responds to the nominal representations rather than to the real ones. 
In addition, they found that this effect is stronger at those people who exhibit 
higher degree of money illusion in a questionnaire designed on the lines of Shafir 
et al. (1997).   
My interpretation is as follows: Prizes were denominated in dollars, thus the 
initial representation of rewards must have been nominal, in dollars. It is un-
derstandable that a 150 dollar prize incites a greater BOLD response than a 100 
dollar prize, since it is a higher nominal reward, and the brain has a nominal rep-
resentation. When the prices in the catalogue are perceived, a temporary explicit 
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specific real representation (tailored to the specific problem) may be formed that 
gives the same “real” value for the two prizes. Those who have relatively higher 
“expectations” of the 150 dollar prize tend to be those who can form explicit real 
representations less easily. As the money is “earmarked”, the experiment does 
not give information about the real representations, as I use the concept in this 
paper. 
4. SURROGATES OF REAL REPRESENTATIONS
My interpretation differs from that of Shafir et al. (1997) in that they seem to 
think that there is one “true” real representation, and nominal representations in-
terfere with the application of that. I think there is absolutely no reason to believe 
in any “true” real representation. Real representations (either explicit or implicit) 
are not truer than any nominal representation. Their availability affects behaviour 
and the “well-being” of people, but that is all.  
My claim is that explicit real representations do not exist permanently and the 
main reasons are their inherent multiplicity and individuality. Alternatively, im-
plicit real representations can very well exist but are hard to communicate, which 
makes them serviceable only for a limited range of tasks. This leaves many peo-
ple with nominal representations that have, occasionally, untoward consequences. 
When we become aware of the damages nominal representations may cause, we 
search for solutions others than forming real representations. 
People look for surrogates of real representations usually when inflation is 
quite high. This is a situation when we “feel” most strongly that nominal values 
are not “real”, and economic calculations require some quantitative measure of 
wealth (on a ratio scale) that is “stable”. Switching to a foreign (stable) currency 
is a frequently employed solution, but from the cognitive point of view it is a 
substitution of one nominal representation with another. We have also seen that 
when inflation is abated, people are more than willing to switch back to a nominal 
representation in terms of their own currency, which is used in everyday life, and 
therefore comes more easily to mind as suggested by the ACT-R theory.   
In capital markets, nominal interest rates normally reflect inflationary expecta-
tions. The variable rate contracts are also a well-recognized partial solution for 
the money illusion problem. A resort to shortening maturities and frequent rene-
gotiation of contracts are not very pleasant, but can be regarded as improvements 
in the long-term nominal contracting. If the commonly accepted real representa-
tions existed, these imperfect solutions would disappear.  
These contractual solutions are admittedly partial. How would a more com-
plete solution look like? Shiller (1998) is in favour of introducing indexed units 
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of accounts, like the Chilean unidad de fomento. Indeed, widespread indexation, 
with some commonly accepted price index, can be conceived as the introduction 
of an indexed unit of account, without explicitly giving it a name and unit. An 
indexed unit of account cannot drive out standard (means of exchange) money 
as some prices must be quoted in the legal tender in order that the index and the 
exchange rate between the two “moneys” can be definable. This dual system can 
survive, as it has survived in Chile and in many countries in the Middle Ages, 
where for centuries the means of exchange and standard units of accounts were 
different (e.g. Weber 1996). Shiller (1998) suggests the introduction of several 
artificial units, serving different objectives. In fact, Chile has had a special ac-
counting unit for tax purposes. However, this solution of “multiple real moneys” 
may also have its shortcomings, and these shortcomings are related to cognitive 
factors. Perhaps the existence of multiple competing values is hard to digest for 
our brain, and retaining several explicit value representations for a substantial 
time is not easy.
5. THE SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS FOR MONEY ILLUSION
Lea and Webley (2006) argue that money illusion is incompatible with what the 
authors call the Tool Theory of Money, whereby money is a means for achiev-
ing certain goals (real consumption). The “Tool Theory” is another name for the 
classical economic approach with respect to the functions of money. The authors 
advance the Drug Theory of Money, according to which money is like a drug, i.e. 
something which is desirable in itself by producing certain physiological effects 
on the brain. Their hypothesis is that money parasitizes on basic human instincts, 
like the instinct to trade (related to reciprocal altruism), and object play. The idea 
of money as drug can explain why people seem to care for monetary values with-
out bothering to figure out the purchasing power of money prizes.  
There exists another area of research that can shed light on the psychological 
bases of money illusion. Economists have their usual foundational story about 
money: money’s role is the facilitation of barter, but money is not the essential 
thing. However, ethnographers have long claimed that historically money has 
never come into being as a solution to the “double coincidence of wants” prob-
lem (See Graeber 2011 and Martin 2013 for a summary of the ethnographic evi-
dences). Rather, the genesis of money is intimately related to debt (Graeber 2011, 
Ch 2.). Graeber (2011, Ch 3.) emphasises that the concept of being in debt is an 
important social psychological fact in many ancient and non-industrial societies. 
Ancient religions hold that there exists some primordial debt and debt is an es-
sential feature of human existence. According to Graeber, money can be regarded 
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as an invention that enabled men to quantify debt and to work out detailed rules 
about its management. Likewise, Martin (2013: 21) claims that the transferability 
of debt was a revolutionary idea, and money served for this purpose as a unit of 
account. Clearly, any quantification makes sense only if it is inter-subjective, thus 
money was created as a measure of abstract universal value. Thinking in terms 
of money thus became a fundamental thing in social consciousness. It seems that 
debt had much more significance as an organizing principle of human relations 
than the exchange of useful goods. Money, as a measure of debt, had an edge that 
acquired a special place in social relations. Monetary value may have induced 
a feeling of objectively measuring things like prestige, honor, or freedom (each 
related to debt), and may have acquired a psychological status independent of the 
material things that money could buy.  
Thus money illusion can, for several reasons, be an expression of a feature of 
the human psyche: money has an intrinsic value for us independently of its use 
as a medium of exchange. For traditional economists it may seem an inexplicable 
irrationality. But if we regard it as a matter of taste, we have no ground for urging 
the “abolition” of money illusion. At most we must concede that money illusion 
can interfere with other goals. If we care for the welfare of people having money 
illusion, we have to devise policies that minimize this conflict. Therefore, there 
may be a social dividend to provide stability to the purchasing power of money, 
ensuring inter-temporal and inter-subjective comparability. Money and money 
illusion are intertwined, and the elimination of money illusion can occur only via 
the elimination of money itself: a rather unlikely event in the foreseeable future. 
6. SUMMARY AND LESSONS
Traditional economics assumes that, by magic, people behave as if they are able to 
calculate real income. Money illusion phenomena show that they do not. Still, it is 
not necessarily a big problem for them, as I have shown in Section 4. Even if peo-
ple have (necessarily) shallow knowledge, together they can prove to be smarter 
than individually (Sloman – Fernbach 2017). Indeed, many people’s vague sense 
of a “real” value of money may support social institutions that defend us from mak-
ing gross mistakes (indexation, artificial units of accounts, etc.). And using crisp 
and inter-subjective nominal representations may be a catalyst to act concertedly. 
Alternatively, it would be pretentious to think that money illusion can safely be 
ignored. Anyway, this phenomenon offers an occasion to study the role of knowl-
edge representation on economic decisions, a topic of great interest in itself.
There are two main building blocks of the framework I apply in this paper: the 
non-existence of stable preferences and a theory of cognition based on that em-
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bodied in cognitive architectures. By reinterpreting the evidence I conclude that 
people have durable explicit nominal and implicit real representations. People 
may have explicit real representations, but these are fleeting. Nominal represen-
tations recur and are communicable, which makes them convenient in social in-
teractions. Decisions are based on some nominal representations as a default, but 
implicit real representations may cause equivocation, and can usher in surrogate 
responses when people detect that nominal representations are not satisfactory. 
A large part of economics is dressed in mathematical formulas, and many of 
these formulas refer to individual decisions by humans. By necessity economic 
theories entail a view on what and how human beings know about the world. Its 
implicit framework of declarative knowledge is that of the state-space representa-
tion: there exist objectively distinct possible states of the world, and people can 
observe certain events (subsets of elementary states). Rational agents are those 
whose views never collide with reality, but more modern theories can incorporate 
boundedly rational agents as well, who may be (objectively) wrong. Anyhow, 
the declarative knowledge base is purely symbolic. As far as procedural knowl-
edge is concerned, rationalist theories usually postulate unlimited abilities to ap-
ply standard logic and mathematics, including the theory of probability. Again, 
modern approaches may weaken this assumption and may allow for mistakes in 
deriving conclusions relevant to actions. 
Cognitive architectures are different from that picture along several dimen-
sions. Firstly, in a cognitive architecture knowing the Kolmogorov Axioms 
of Probability Theory does not mean that someone can derive or use the Law 
of Large Numbers. Part of our knowledge resides in how and when to use proce-
dures (“production rules”). Secondly, not all inference is deductive, procedures 
can be based on induction, and they can be learnt and forgotten. Thirdly, de-
clarative knowledge may not be symbolic. Implicit knowledge is different in kind 
from explicit knowledge in the sense that the clear separation of the world into 
distinct events does not apply, and reaching “conclusions” cannot be subsumed 
by traditional predicate calculus or one of its extensions.  
Cognitive architectures have been used to study economic decision problems, 
but not very extensively. It is no wonder why. To build a mathematical theory that 
obtains interesting conclusions is much easier with the knowledge representation 
so far employed by economists. In this paper I wished to point out that the issue 
of money illusion for the current economic modelling approaches is “beyond the 
pale”. In other words, every attempt to mathematically model money illusion 
with the state-space approach would yield spurious results, and that would, at 
best, deliver only trivialities about the phenomenon. I do not believe that eco-
nomic thinking must be stopped when we face such a barrier. Indeed, I think that 
it is wrong to assume that all of economics is, or must be, model-based. It follows 
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from the reasoning above: not all of our knowledge is explicit, and even if it is, 
it is not necessarily deductive. Therefore, I list some positive implications of the 
distinction between implicit and explicit representations of value for economics. 
One corollary of money illusion for macroeconomists has been that the Phil-
lips-curve (understood in modern macroeconomics as any nominal price and 
wage setting equation) must recognize it (Akerlof et al. 2000). My analysis sug-
gests that the demand part of the standard macroeconomic model is also prone to 
correction. Variables like real balances, real exchange rates and real interest rates 
can be replaced with their components, i.e. nominal balances and nominal prices. 
For econometric investigations the implication is that it is a must to test whether 
“real” variables can be used in an estimation exercise at all. The current practice 
does not consider this testing as necessary, rather researchers check the robust-
ness of their results by trying out different measures of real wages, real exchange 
rates, etc. I propose an explicit “data mining” approach, since the implicit repre-
sentation of real values can be likened to data mining by the mind. 
Also, a case can be developed for approaching price index theory from a psy-
chological point of view. It is not at all obvious that all prices are represented in 
the same way in our minds. Some may be more important for our perception of 
the real value of money than others. Index number theorists have been concerned 
with the right measure of the cost of living, for instance, and suggested solutions 
to adjust for quality changes (Griliches 1961). Is it true that our mind considers 
new computers cheaper only because they provide better performance for the 
same amount of money? Or rather our concept of “computer” automatically up-
dates it for technological advance, and for us today’s average computer is exactly 
the same as that of five years ago? 
The modern theory of monetary policy has addressed the problem of whether 
central banks should target low inflation or stable price levels. Though it is con-
ceded that a stable price level has certain advantages, the consensus view is that 
low (zero) inflation is the correct target. However, there has been abroad a dis-
sident view that because of money illusion and fairness considerations the correct 
inflation target must be somewhat higher than 1–2%, so 3–4% annual inflation 
can be optimal (Ball 2013). This argument is based on a sort of double distortion: 
fairness preferences prevent necessary real wage adjustment during low infla-
tion, but money illusion enables us to overcome this when inflation is somewhat 
higher. Small nominal wage increases are well received by workers, who do not 
realize that their real wage decreases. However, if it is true that durable explicit 
real representations do not exist, then all sorts of long-term decisions must suffer 
from money illusion in times of inflation. It follows that price level instability 
may play havoc with fairness heuristics. If we also believe that fairness heuristics 
may encourage cooperation (Heinrich 2004), then we have a reason to favour 
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stable prices, not just very low inflation.5 The (social) psychological evidence 
(Section 5) militates in favour of the same conclusion. 
I would like to add a last word concerning the future of economic theoriz-
ing. Decisions are based on several kinds of knowledge representations. To study 
theoretically the interactions of individual decisions – the par excellence problem 
of economics – one needs a framework that accommodates realistic knowledge 
representation with fine-grained interaction of possibly many agents. The deci-
sion-theoretical basis of such a framework must be a cognitive architecture. The 
type of agent-based social simulation that Sun (2006) promotes seems to be the 
future of a substantial segment of economic theorizing. Alternatively, a cognitive 
architecture must observe psychological realities, such as the possible drug-like 
function of money and also its social significance as a measure of debt. 
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